

Topics in Cryptography: Homework 3

Submit by June 12, 2011.

Note: If you cannot solve an item which is part of a question, you can still solve other items in this question assuming that the first holds.

1. Let p, q be prime numbers, and $n=pq$. For a number $m \in [0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1]$ we can use the representation $[a, b]$, where $a = m \bmod p$, and $b = m \bmod q$.
 - a. Show that for $m_1, m_2, m \in [0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1]$, if the representation of m_1 is $[a_1, b_1]$ and the representation of m_2 is $[a_2, b_2]$, then the representation of $m = m_1 + m_2$ is $[a, b]$, where $a = a_1 + a_2 \bmod p$, and $b = b_1 + b_2 \bmod q$.
 - b. State and prove a similar claim for multiplication.
 - c. For $x, y \in [0, 1, 2, \dots, p-1]$, how is it possible to *efficiently* compute $z = x/y \bmod p$? I.e., compute a number $z \in [0, 1, 2, \dots, p-1]$ that satisfies $yz = x \bmod p$.
 - d. State and prove a claim (similar to (a) and (b)) for division modulo n .
2. Let $n=pq$. Define $\lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(p-1, q-1)$, i.e., $\lambda(n)$ is the least common multiple of $p-1$ and $q-1$. (If $p=11, q=19$, then $\lambda(n)=90$.)
 - a. Show that if $a = 1 \bmod \lambda(n)$ then for all $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ it holds that $m^a = m \bmod n$. (Hint: use the CRT.)
 - b. Show that in the RSA cryptosystem one can choose e, d to satisfy $ed = 1 \bmod \lambda(n)$. (Instead of satisfying $ed = 1 \bmod \phi(n)$.)
3. Consider the following public-key encryption scheme. The public key is (G, q, g, h) and the private key is $x = \log_g h$, generated exactly as in the El Gamal scheme. In order to encrypt a bit b the sender does the following:
 - a. If $b=0$ it chooses a random $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computes $C_1 = g^y$ and $C_2 = h^y$. The ciphertext is (C_1, C_2) .
 - b. If $b=1$ it chooses independent random $y, z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computes $C_1 = g^y$ and $C_2 = g^z$. The ciphertext is (C_1, C_2) .

Show that it is possible to decrypt efficiently given knowledge of the private key x .

Prove, by showing a reduction, that if the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption is hard in \mathbb{Z}_q then this encryption scheme is secure against chosen plaintext attacks.