# Introduction to Cryptography

## Lecture 1

Benny Pinkas

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#### **Bibliography**

- Textbook:
- Cryptography Theory and Practice, Second edition by D.
   Stinson. (Also, a version in עברית by the Open University!).
- Optional:
- Handbook of Applied Cryptography, by A. Menezes, P. Van Oorschot, S. Vanstone. (Free!)
- Introduction to Cryptography Applied to Secure Communication and Commerce, by Amir Herzberg. (Free!)
- Applied Cryptography, by B. Schneier.

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#### **Administrative Details**

- Grade
- Exam 75%
- Homework 25% (might include programming)
- Office hours: Tuesday, 11-12.
- Email: benny@cs.haifa.ac.il
- Web page: http://www.pinkas.net/courses/itc/2005/index.html
- Goal: Learn the basics of modern cryptography
- Method: introductory, applied, precise.

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#### In the Library

- In the "reserved books" section:
- · Four copies of
- Cryptography :theory and practice / Douglas R. Stinson
- Introduction to cryptography :principles and applications /Hans Delfs, Helmut Knebl
- Foundations of cryptography / Oded Goldreich
- One copy of
- Handbook of applied cryptography / Alfred J. Menezes et al. (also available online)
- Applied cryptography / Bruce Schneier


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
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
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# Course Outline Course Outline Data secrecy: encryption Symmetric encryption Asymmetric (public key) encryption Data Integrity: authentication, digital signatures. Required background in number theory Cryptographic protocols

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# **Security Goals**

- (1) No adversary can determine *m* or, even better.
- (2) No adversary can determine any information about *m*
- Suppose m = "attack on Sunday, October 17, 2004".
- The adversary can at most learn that
  - m = "attack on S\*\*day, Oct\*\*er 17, 2004"
  - m = "\*\*\*\*\* \*\* \*u\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\* \*\*\*\*
- Here, goal (1) is satisfied, but not goal (2)

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#### **Adversarial Power**

- Types of attacks:
- Ciphertext only attack ciphertext known to the adversary (eavesdropping)
- Known plaintext attack plaintext and ciphertext are known to the adversary
- Chosen plaintext attack the adversary can choose the plaintext and obtain its encryption (e.g. he has access to the encryption system)
- Chosen ciphertext attack the adversary can choose the ciphertext and obtain its decryption
- Assume restrictions on the adversary's capabilities, but not that it is using specific attacks or strategies.

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#### **Adversarial Model**

- Adversary Knows encryption and decryption algorithms E and D, and message space.
- Kerckhoff's Principle (1883):
- The only thing Eve does not know is the secret key *k*
- The design is public
  - · Allows public scrutiny of the design
- No need to replace the system if the design is exposed -> no need to keep the design secret
- Same design can be used for multiple applications
- · Focus on securing the key
- Examples
- Security by obscurity, Intel's HDCP 🕾
- DES, AES, SSL ☺

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# Breaking the Enigma

- German cipher in WW II
- Kerckhoff's principle
- Known plaintext attack
- (somewhat) chosen plaintext attack



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## Caesar Cipher

- · A shift cipher
- Plaintext: "ATTACK AT DAWN"
- Ciphertext: "DWWDFN DW GDZQ"
- Key:  $k \in \mathbb{R} \{0,25\}$ . (In this example k=3)
- More formally:
- Key:  $k ∈_R \{0...25\}$ , chosen at random.
- Message space: English text (i.e., {0...25} |m|)
- Algorithm: ciphertext letter = plaintext letter + k mod 25
- Kerckhoff's principle
- Not a good idea

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#### Adversary's computation power

- Theoretically
- Adversary can perform poly(|k|) computation
- Key space =  $2^{|k|}$
- Practically
- $|\mathbf{k}| = 64$  is too short
- |k| = 80 starts to be reasonable
- Why? (what can be done by 1000 computers in a year?)
- $2^{55} = 2^{20}$  (ops per second)
- x 2<sup>20</sup> (seconds in two weeks)
- $\times 2^5$  (  $\approx$  fortnights in a year) (might invest more than a year...)
- x 2<sup>10</sup> (computers in parallel)
- All this, assuming that the adversary cannot do better than a brute force attack

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#### **Brute Force Attacks**

- Brute force attack : adversary tests all key space and checks which key decrypts the message
- Caesar cipher: |key space| = 26
- We need a large key space
- Usually, the key is a bit string chosen uniformly at random from  $\{0,1\}^{|k|}$ . Implying  $2^{|k|}$  equiprobable keys.
- How long should k be?
- The adversary should not be able to do 2|k| decryption trials

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#### Monoalphabetic Substitution cipher

## A|B|C|D|E|F|G|H|1|J|K|L|M|N|O|P|Q|R|S|T|U|V|W|X|Y|Z Y A H P O G Z Q W B T S F L R C V M U E K J D I X N

- Plaintext: "ATTACK AT DAWN"
- Ciphertext: "YEEYHT YE PYDL"
- More formally:
- Plaintext space = ciphertext space = {0..25} |m|
- Key space = 1-to-1 mappings of {0..25} (i.e., permutations)
- Encryption: map each letter according to the key
- Key space =  $26! \approx 4 \times 10^{28} \approx 2^{95}$ . (Large enough.)
- Still easy to break

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## Breaking the substitution cipher

- The plaintext has a lot of structure
- Known letter distribution in English (e.g. Pr("e") = 13%).
- Known distribution of pairs of letters ("th" vs. "jj")



# The Vigenere cipher

- Plaintext space = ciphertext space = {0..25} |m|
- Key space = strings of |k| letters {0..25}|K|
- Generate a pad by repeating the key until it is as long as the plaintext (e.g., "SECRETSECRETSEC..")
- Encryption algorithm: add the corresponding characters of the pad and the plaintext
- THIS IS THE PLAINTEXT TO BE ENCRYPTED
- SECR ET SEC RETSECRET SE CR ETSECRETSE
- |Key space| =  $26^{|k|}$ . (k=17 implies |key space|  $\approx 2^{80}$ )
- Each plaintext letter is mapped to |k| different letters

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# Cryptanalysis of a substitution cipher

- OEFP FP OEB CFOPO OBUO
- •QEFP FP QEB CFOPQ QBUQ
- •TH TH T T
- •THFP FP THB CFOPT TBUT
- •THIS IS TH I ST T T
- THIS IS THE CLOST TEUT
- •THIS IS THE I ST TE T
- •THIS IS THE FIRST TEXT

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# Attacking the Vigenere cipher

- Known plaintext attack (or rather, known plaintext distribution)
- Guess the key length |k|
- Examine every /k/ th letter, this is a shift cipher
- $\underline{\mathrm{T}}$ HIS IS  $\underline{\mathrm{T}}$ HE PLAINTEXT  $\underline{\mathrm{T}}$ O BE ENCRYPTED
- $\underline{\underline{S}}$ ECR ET  $\underline{\underline{S}}$ EC RET $\underline{\underline{S}}$ ECRET  $\underline{\underline{S}}$ E CR ET $\underline{\underline{S}}$ ECRET $\underline{\underline{S}}$
- Attack time: |k| x |k| x time of attacking a shift cipher(1)
- Chosen plaintext attack:
  - Use the plaintext "aaaaaaa..."
- (1) Can't assume English plaintext. Can assume known letter frequency

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## **Perfect Cipher**

- What type of security would we like to achieve?
- "Given C, the adversary has no idea what M is"
- Impossible since the adversary might have a-priori information
- In an "ideal" world, the message will be delivered in a magical way, out of the reach of the adversary
- We would like to achieve similar security
- Definition: a perfect cipher
- Pr( plaintext = P | ciphertext = C ) = Pr( plaintext = P)

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#### The one-time-pad is a perfect cipher

- ciphertext = plaintext ⊕ k
- Pr ( ciphertext = 1)
- = Pr (plaintext  $\oplus$  key = 1)
- =  $Pr(key = plaintext \oplus 1) = \frac{1}{2}$
- *Pr(plaintext* = 1 | *ciphertext* = 1)
- = Pr(plaintext = 1 & ciphertext = 1) / Pr(ciphertext = 1)
- =  $Pr(plaintext = 1 \& ciphertext = 1) / \frac{1}{2}$
- = Pr(ciphertext = 1 | plaintext = 1) · Pr(plaintext = 1) / ½
- =  $Pr(key = 0) \cdot Pr(plaintext = 1) / \frac{1}{2}$
- =  $\frac{1}{2}$  · Pr(plaintext = 1) /  $\frac{1}{2}$
- = Pr(plaintext = 1)

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## Perfect Cipher

- For a perfect cipher, it holds that given ciphertext C,
- $Pr(plaintext = P \mid C) = Pr(plaintext = P)$
- i.e., knowledge of ciphertext does not change the a-priori distribution of the plaintext
- Probabilities taken over key space and plaintext space
- One Time Pad (Vernam cipher): (for a one bit plaintext)
  - Plaintext p ∈ {0,1}
- Key  $k \in_{\mathbb{R}} \{0,1\}$  (i.e.  $Pr(k=0) = Pr(k=1) = \frac{1}{2}$ )
- Ciphertext =  $p \oplus k$
- What happens if we know a-priori that *Pr(plaintext=1)=0.8*?

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#### The one-time-pad

- Plaintext =  $p_1p_2...p_m \in \Sigma^m$  (e.g.  $\Sigma$ ={0,1}, or  $\Sigma$ ={A...Z})
- key =  $k_1 k_2 ... k_m \in_R \Sigma^m$
- Ciphertext =  $c_1c_2...c_m$ ,  $c_i = p_i \oplus k_i$
- Essentially a shift cipher with a different key for every character
- Shannon [47,49]:
- An OTP is a perfect cipher, unconditionally secure.  $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{G}}$
- As long as the key is a random string, of the same length as the plaintext.
- Cannot use
- Shorter key (e.g., Vigenere cipher)
- A key which is not chosen uniformly at random

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# What we've learned today

- Introduction
- Kerckhoff's Principle
- Some classic ciphers
- Brute force attacks
- Required key length
- A large key does no guarantee security
- Perfect ciphers

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